Monday, 12 October 2015

When will such complaints be attended to by LIC?



Reference Source: Internet

http://www.consumercomplaints.in/complaints/lic-of-india-non-payment-of-epf-money-after-resignation-from-service      

Lic Of India — Non payment of EPF money after resignation from service



Dt. 24072012


Dear Sir/Mam,
I need to bring it to your notice a very unpleasant, grave and very sad situation that I am facing for the last 11 months after my resignation from my previous employer LIC Of India.
I have worked with LIC of India as Senior Marketing Executive( On Contract basis) for the period 30/03/2010 to 31/07/2011
This was a contractual assignment in Administrative Officer Cadre of LIC Of India, Now I have resigned from LIC and have been relieved on 31/07/2011
But my Provident Fund amount of Rs more than 64000/- is being held up by them and they are not ready to refund it. I have personally met concerned Divisional Officials of Meerut, Zonal Office Kanpur and have written many mails to even LIC Head office Mumbai but every body is just giving me a deaf ear and no body is ready to listen. No body is answering what will happen of my hard earned money.
Sir, I am fed up and frustrated a lot by the system of LIC where an organization is of the intention to guff up even the PROVIDENT FUND of an Ex-Employee.
Sir, I am finding this situation as very unpleasant, emabarrasing and disgusting where I am in the condition of begging for my hard earned money and someone is holding it like it is of his own
My Employment details with LIC Of India is……
Period of employment with LIC: 30/03/2010 to 31/07/2011
Post held: Senior Marketing Executive
SR No : 215134
Place of posting: BO II Ghaziabad Division: Meerut
Nature of Service: Contractual
Details of Salary: 70 % Fixed and 30 % Variable
PF Deduction from Salary: 2000/- pm as employee contribution and
2000/- pm as employer contribution
Amount Held up by LIC Of India: 4000*16 months of service= 64000/- + interest on it

Sir I am writing this mail to you with much hope that you will help a person who is fighting for his hard earned money and I am sure that you will help me in getting justice.
Regards,
Amit Kr Singh

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Tuesday, 6 October 2015

Kerala High Court decides in favour of ADO



                                                  Kerala High Court
          V.A.Shaji vs Life Insurance Corporation Of ... on 23 August, 1985
       
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
 
                              PRESENT:
 
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.V.RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI
 
      MONDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2014/19TH KARTHIKA, 1936
 
                    WP(C).No. 29026 of 2005 (E)
                    ----------------------------
 
 PETITIONER(S):
--------------
 
       V.A.SHAJI, FLAT NO.805,
       GARDEN GATE APARTMENTS,
       GANDHI NAGAR P.O., KOCHI-20.
 
       BY ADV. SRI.S.RADHAKRISHNAN
 
 
RESPONDENT(S):
--------------
 
     1. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA,
       CENTRAL OFFICE, MUMBAI, REP. BY ITS
       EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.
 
     2. THE CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE
       CORPORATION OF INDIA, CENTRAL OFFICE, MUMBAI.
 
     3. DIVISIONAL MANAGER,
       LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA
       DIVISIONAL OFFICE, KOCHI.
 
       R1 TO R3  BY ADV. SRI.VARGHESE C.KURIAKOSE
       R1 TO R3  BY ADV. SRI.P.J.ANTONY
       R1 TO R3  BY ADV. SRI.PRAVEEN K. JOY
       R1 TO R3  BY ADV. SRI.VARGHESE BABU
 
 
       THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD  ON
       10-11-2014, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
       FOLLOWING:
 
 
bka/-
 
WP(C).No. 29026 of 2005 (E)
----------------------------
 
 
                             APPENDIX
 
 
PETITIONER'(S) EXHIBITS:
 
EXT.P1     COPY OF THE APPOINTMENT ORDER DATED 23.08.1985.
 
EXT.P2     COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 27.07.1987 ISSUED TO THE
           PETITIONER BY THE BRANCH MANAGER, LIC OF INDIA, BRANCH
           OFFICE, ALWAYE.
 
EXT.P3     COPY OF THE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION DATED 07.04.2005 GIVEN
           BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
 
EXT.P4     COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 02.05.2005 ISSUED TO THE
           PETITIONER BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
 
EXT.P5     COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS NO.08/PER DATED 31.05.2005 OF THE
           BRANCH MANAGER, LIC OF INDIA, ALWAYE BRANCH.
 
EXT.P6     COPY OF THE CIRCULAR NO.3872/ASP/2005 DATED 08.09.2005
           ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT.
 
EXT.P7     COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 27.10.2005.
 
EXT.P8     COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL DATED 10.11.2006.
 
EXT.P9     COPY OF THE LETTER ISSUED BY THE LIC DATED 22.01.2010
           ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENTS.
 
 
RESPONDENT'(S) EXHIBITS: NIL
 
 
 
                                                    //TRUE COPY//
 
 
 
                                                    PA TO JUDGE
 
bka/-
 
 
 
            A.V. RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI, J.
        --------------------------------------------------
               W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005
        --------------------------------------------------
      Dated this the 10th day of November, 2014
 
                      J U D G M E N T
The petitioner, a former Development Officer of the respondent corporation, has approached this Court for a declaration that the first proviso to Clause 3(1) of the LIC of India Development Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2005 (Ext.P6) insofar as it relates to denial of pay revision benefits to Development Officers, who were in the full time salaried service of the corporation during the equitable relief period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005 and who resigned thereafter before the date of Ext.P6 notification, is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, fanciful, oppressive and unconstitutional. There is a further prayer for a direction to the respondents to sanction and disburse the pay revision benefits to the petitioner forthwith as per Ext.P6 notification and for other consequential benefits.

W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..2..
2. The petitioner entered into the service of the 1st respondent corporation as an Apprentice Development officer on 02.09.1985. His service as Development Officer was confirmed on 01.04.1987. On 07.04.2005, a notice of resignation was sent to the 2nd respondent for resigning from the respondent corporation. On 02.05.2005, Ext.P4 letter was issued by the 2nd respondent intimating the decision of the competent authority accepting the resignation of the petitioner with effect from 31.05.2005; and accordingly, he was relieved from duties on the aforesaid date on acceptance of the resignation by the competent authority. Ext.P6 notification envisages revision of pay for Development Officers, who were in service during the equitable relief period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005. The grievance of the petitioner is that by virtue of Ext.P6, the benefit has been denied to the Development Officers, whose resignation have been accepted on or before Ext.P6 notification irrespective of whether they are relieved or not or whose services had  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..3..
been terminated under LIC of India Development Officers (Revision of terms & conditions of service) Rules, 1989 or Rule 39 of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960, during the period between 01.08.2002 and 05.09.2005 (both days inclusive). The petitioner alleges that as he was working under the respondent corporation during the equitable relief period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005 and he resigned from the post only on 31.05.2005, there is no justification for denying the pay revision benefits. It is with this background, the petitioner has come up before this Court.
3. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent corporation, who resisted the writ petition, it is contended that the petitioner has voluntarily resigned with sanction from the competent authority and his terminal benefits were disbursed by the respondent corporation at the time of relieving from duties. From all these facts, it can be seen that the petitioner has severed all his connections and relations with the corporation;  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..4..
and therefore, subsequent to 31.05.2005, he is no longer an officer of the 1st respondent. It was contended that the benefits conferred by Ext.P6 were intended for serving officers and also for those officers, who have rendered their services for the corporation and superannuated from the corporation. The intention that could be gathered from the instructions is that it was for the Development Officers, who were in the whole time salaried service in the permanent establishment of the corporation during the beneficiary period. It was by way of an equitable relief. The words, superannuation, voluntary retirement, compulsory retirement and resignation have clear and different connotations in the realm of service jurisprudence; and the apex court has clearly distinguished between the various modes of exit. The benefits conferred by Ext.P6 deals with equitable relief, which could be applicable only to the existing Development Officers. Therefore, it was contended that the corporation is perfectly justified in excluding officers,  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..5..
whose resignation had been accepted on or before the date of notification irrespective of whether they are relieved or not or whose services had been terminated under the LIC of India Development Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989. Thus, they prayed for a dismissal of the writ petition.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent corporation quite in extenso.
5. Clause 2(f) of Ext.P6 defines "Period of Equitable Relief" as the period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005 or the period within those dates during which an employee was a Development Officer. Clause 2(b) defines an "Existing Officer" as a whole time salaried officer in the permanent establishment of the corporation, who was in the service on the date of notification. The petitioner was not in service as he was relieved on 31.05.2005 from the post of Development Officer on acceptance of the resignation by the competent authority,  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..6..
which is an admitted fact. The eligibility criteria is detailed in Clause 3. Clause 3 states that Ext.P6 shall apply to the Development Officers, who were in whole time salaried service in the permanent establishment of the corporation as on 01.08.2002 and those who have joined the whole time salaried service in the permanent establishment of the corporation after that date. Evidently, and admittedly too, the petitioner joined the whole time salaried service in the respondent corporation after 01.08.2002. Therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid clause, the petitioner comes within the zone of consideration for eligibility. However, the benefit is denied to the petitioner on account of the proviso attached to Clause 3(1), which reads as follows;
"Provided, however, that those Development officers whose resignation had been accepted on or before the date of notification irrespective of whether they are relieved or not or whose services had been terminated under LIC of India Development Officers (Revision of terms & conditions of service) Rules, 1989 or Rule 39 of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960, during the period between 1.8.2002 and 5.9.2005 (both days inclusive) shall not be eligible for the arrears on account of this revision."

W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..7..
6. The petitioner alleges that the pay revision benefit was granted to the Development Officers, who were in service from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005, in view of the service rendered by them during the said period. As the petitioner was working as Development Officer during the equitable period, though he has resigned from the post on 31.03.2005, there is no justification in denying the pay revision benefits to the petitioner; so submitted the learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent corporation, per contra, justifies the stand of the corporation. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the intention of the corporation, which is gathered from the instructions, is that the same is intended for serving officers and also for those officers, who were in the whole time salaried service of the corporation during the eligibility period. It was further contended that the the petitioner would never satisfy the requirement of an existing officer. Relying on two  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..8..
decisions of the apex court, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent submitted that superannuation is virtually cessation of service on attainment of age of retirement and it is neither an act of employment nor an act of employer, whereas voluntary retirement and resignation are both voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave the service. In support of the said argument, the learned Standing Counsel relied on the decision of the apex court in UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal [2004 KHC 779]. On going through the said decision, it can be seen that the apex court considered an entirely different situation. The respondent in that case opted for the pension scheme introducing the terms of the settlement dated 29.10.1993 between the Indian Banks' Association and All India Banks Employees' Association, which categorically ruled out employees, who have resigned or dismissed or removed from the service. As the respondent in that case had resigned in 1988, the bank declined to accept his option for admitting him as a  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..9..
member/beneficiary of the fund. He filed a suit for declaration that he is entitled to pension. The suit was decreed; and the first appeal filed against the judgment of the trial court as also the second appeal filed by the bank were dismissed. Thus, the bank took the matter in appeal before the apex court. The apex court observed that the reason for disqualifying a dismissed employee or employees, who have resigned from membership of the fund, was not far to seek. It was observed that in a self financing scheme, a separate fund is earmarked as the scheme is not based on budgetary support. Therefore, it is essentially based on adequate contributions from the members of the fund. Normally, retirement is allowed only on completion of qualifying service, which is not there in the case of resignation. When such a retirement is opted for self financing pension scheme, he brings in accumulated contribution earned by him after completing qualifying number of years of service under Provident Fund Rules, whereas a person, who resigns, may not have  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..10..
adequate credit balance to his provident fund account. For this reason, and also on account of the reason that the scheme in that case was not a continuation of the earlier scheme, the apex court observed that the respondent was not entitled to the benefit and reversed the judgment of the High Court.
8. Here, in this case, the petitioner was in service for about 20 years up to 30.05.2005. The pay revision benefit is granted to the Development Officers, who were in service during the period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005, in relation to the service rendered by them during the said period. Therefore, it is rendering of service during the relevant period that matters and not the date of the notification bringing into force Ext.P6 instructions for the purpose of enjoying the benefit of pay revision. Therefore, the proviso to Clause 3(1) of Ext.P6, which confines the benefit to the Development Officers existing on the date of the notification, i.e., 05.09.2005, and excluding the officers, who demitted their office on  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..11..
account of resignation, is arbitrary and illegal. The respondent corporation has no case that the service of the petitioner was not satisfactory at any point of time during his service. The payment of monetary benefit, in this case, is not based on any contribution from the employees.
9. Yet another decision pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent corporation is the decision of the apex court in Prabhakar M.R. & others v. Canara Bank & Others [2012 KHC 4559]. In that case, the apex court was dealing with a case of certain employees, who had submitted their resignations between 24.07.1986 and 03.06.1993 prior to the signing of the Statutory Settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There, the apex court observed that the appellants failed to show any pre-existing rights in their favour either in the Statutory Settlement/Joint Note or under the Regulations, 1995; and therefore, they were not covered by the pension scheme introduced by the  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..12..
banks. Therefore, this decision also has no application to the situation here.
10. A scrutiny of Clause 3(1) would show that the benefit of pay revision is extended even to Development Officers, who retired from service or died on or after 01.08.2002 without rendering full time service during the whole period between 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005. That being so, it is unjustifiable to deny the pay revision benefits to a sincere and dedicated Development Officer, against whom, the corporation has no complaints. It is crucial to note that in Ext.P5, which is a letter dated 31.05.2005 issued by the corporation to the petitioner, the corporation has commented the service of the petitioner as dedicated and sincere. It is an accepted proposition of the law that an employee, who has voluntarily retired from service is entitled to claim the benefit of pay revision effected for the periods in service even after the retirement. It is an enforceable right and the said right cannot be taken away or denied by  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..13..
executive instructions issued in exercise of the rule making power. Like the case of voluntary retirement, resignation also is on the volition of the employee. The petitioner's resignation was accepted by the respondent corporation without any protest. Therefore, the petitioner can be treated at par with an employee, who sought voluntary retirement as he had the required qualifying service. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner left the service at a time when there was no voluntary retirement schemes.
11. The scales of pay of Development Officers have been revised by the LIC of India Development Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Amendment Rules, 2005. The 2nd respondent has framed Ext.P6 Instructions, 2005 in exercise of the power conferred on him under Rule 51 read with Rule 4 of the LIC of India (Staff) Rules, 1960, providing for the method of fixation in the new scales of pay and other matters connected therewith. In exercise of the said power, the  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..14..
2nd respondent cannot incorporate a provision like the one added by the first proviso to Clause 3(1) of Ext.P6, thereby denying the benefits of pay revision to Development Officers, who were in the whole time salaried service of the corporation during the equitable relief period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005 and who resigned thereafter before the date of Ext.P6 notification. As the relief is granted for the service rendered during the period of 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005, the relief cannot be denied to employees based on the date of the notification effecting revision of pay. Therefore, the first proviso to Clause 3(1) of Ext.P6 is beyond the scope of the rule making power conferred on the 2nd respondent. The power has been exercised by the 2nd respondent improperly for an improper purpose, bringing out unjust and inequitable results. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Clause 3(1) of Ext.P6 insofar as it denies pay revision  W.P.(C) No. 29026 of 2005 ..15..
benefits to Development Officers, who were in the full time salaried service of the 1st respondent corporation during the equitable relief period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005 and who resigned thereafter before the date of Ext.P6 notification, is quashed as it is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory.
It is hereby declared that the petitioner is entitled to pay revision benefits, for which he is duly eligible for the service rendered by him during the equitable period from 01.08.2002 to 31.03.2005.
The respondent corporation is directed to sanction and disburse the pay revision benefits within a period of three months from today.
Sd/-
A.V. RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI, JUDGE bka/-
*********************************************************************************
Source: www.indiankanoon.org

Monday, 28 September 2015

Extract from the NHRC website

26
National Human Rights Commission
upon an area which is not within the jurisdiction of the Chairman
of the Corporation.
Revision of scales of pay as also other allowances is technical
in nature. When a benefit is extended to a group of employees the
effect of such benefit, if otherwise comes within the purview thereof
must be held to be applicable to other groups of employees also.
An employee is entitled to gratuity. It is not a bounty. It is
payable on successful tenure of service. Regulation 77 provides as
to how the amount of gratuity is to be calculated. Regulation 51
provides for a rule of measurement. Only because it employed the
word “permanent basic pay”, the same will not by itself lead to the
conclusion that once an employee has retired, he would not be
entitled to any revision of the amount of gratuity.
The Chairman of the Corporation has himself given retrospective
effect to revision in scales of pay. Such a retrospective effect has
also been given so as to benefit a class of employees. The employees,
irrespective of the fact whether they had superannuated or not,
were given the benefit of arrears of pay from 1st August, 1993. By
reason of grant of such benefit both to serving employees as well as
the superannuated employees, both the class of employees became
entitled by right.
If due to the above reason, an employee became entitled to the
benefit of the revised scale of pay as on the date of retirement, the
same for all intent and purpose must be taken to be the permanent
basic pay, apart from other allowances, if any, which are required
to be taken into consideration for the purpose of computation of
the amount of gratuity.
It cannot be said that the Chairman of the Corporation having
power to fix the cut-off dates for different purposes, also has
27
Retiral Benefits as a Human
Right – NHRC
Initiatives
jurisdiction to do so for payment of gratuity, which has a direct
nexus with the revised pay of scale.
Once the Chairman fixes a cut-off date for the purpose of giving
effect to the agreement vis-a-vis the payment of arrears in terms
thereof, he cannot exercise further jurisdiction in respect of a matter
which is not controlled by Chapter IV but is controlled by other
provisions of statutes and Parliamentary Acts governing the field.
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that an employee is
entitled to gratuity, and it is not a bounty. If an employee became
entitled to revised pay on date of retirement, his revised pay must
be taken to be permanent pay for purpose of computation of gratuity.
A delegate cannot act in violation of a statute - A sub-delegate
cannot exercise any power which is not meant to be conferred upon
him by reason of statutory provision - Gratuity is not covered under
Regulation 51 - Provident Fund and Gratuity are ordinarily governed
by the Acts enacted by Parliament subject to conditions contained
therein - Regulation 77 provides as to how amount of gratuity is to
be calculated – Regulation 51 provides for a rule of measurement -
Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 -
Regulations 51 and 77 - Life Insurance Corporation of India Class I
Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Instructions,
1996. Words and Phrases: Expression “and other matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto” occurring in Regulation 51(2) of
Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 -
Connotation of. The Chairman of the appellant-Life Insurance
Corporation, pursuant to revision of pay of the employees of the
Corporation, in exercise of powers under Regulation 51 of the LIC
of India (Staff) Regulations 1960, issued Life Insurance Corporation
of India Class I Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service)
Instructions, 1996, fixing cut-off dates for grant of different
28
National Human Rights Commission
allowances as also the pay. The cut-off date for revision of pay was
fixed as 1.4.1993. However, for payment of gratuity, the cut-off date
was fixed as 1.8.1994, which was challenged in some of the High
Courts.
The Gujarat High Court and the Karnataka High Court upheld
the validity of the 1996 Instructions whereas the Kerala High Court
in the judgment under appeal took a different view. In the instant
appeal filed by the Life Insurance Corporation, it was contended for
the respondent, the employees, that the power of the Chairman of
the appellant-Corporation to issue instructions under Regulation
51 being limited to Chapter IV of the Regulations, the 1996
Instructions had no application to payment of gratuity, which is
covered by Regulation 77. The question for consideration before
the Court was: Whether the expression,
“The date from which the
revision shall apply, and other matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto”,
occurring in Regulation 51 of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India Regulations, 1960 would also include the matter
relating to payment of gratuity which is otherwise covered by
Regulation 77.

gratuity.
The appellant’s argument was that the payment of pension and
gratuity under the Pension Rules being a package by itself, and
that package having been made applicable to the employees of the
MCD, the provisions of payment of gratuity under the Payment of
Gratuity Act could not be held applicable.
The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Pension
Rules as well as the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The
Payment of Gratuity Act being a special provision for payment of
gratuity, except if there is any provision, which excludes its
applicability to an employee otherwise governed by the provisions
of the Pension Rules, it is not possible to hold that the respondent
is not entitled to the gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act.
The only provision, which was pointed out, was the definition
of “employee” in Section 2(e), which excludes the employees of the
Central Government and State Governments receiving pension and
gratuity under the Pension Rules but not an employee of the MCD.
The MCD employee, therefore, was held entitled to the payment of
gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The fact that the gratuity
was provided for under the Pension Rules did not render him
ineligible to get the payment of gratuity under the Payment of
Gratuity Act.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that the employees of the
MCD would be entitled to the payment of gratuity under the Payment
of Gratuity Act, despite the provisions of the Pension Rules having
30
National Human Rights Commission
been made applicable to them for the purpose of determining the
pension. In the above circumstance, the employees cannot claim
gratuity available under the Pension Rules.
6. D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of India
11
This case was related to pensioners being denied increased
pensionary benefits due to their date of retirement.
By a Memorandum dated May 25
th
, 1979 the Government of
India liberalized the formula for computation of pension in respect
of employees governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,
1972 and made it applicable to employees retiring on or after March
31, 1979. By another Memorandum issued on September 23
rd
, 1979
it extended the same, subject to certain limitations, to the Armed
Forces’ personnel retiring on or after April 1, 1979.
Petitioners D.S.Nakara and another, who had retired in the year
1972 from the Central Civil Service and the Armed Forces’ service
respectively, and Petitioner No. 3, a registered society espousing
the cause of pensioners all over the country, challenged the validity
of the above two memoranda in so far as the liberalization in
computation of pension had been made applicable only to those
retiring on or after the date specified and the benefit of liberalization
had been denied to all those who had retired earlier.
Counsel for petitioners contended that all pensioners entitled
to receive pension under the relevant rules form a class, irrespective
of the dates of their retirement and there cannot be a mini-
classification within this class. Further, that the differential
treatment accorded to those who had retired prior to the specified
date is a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India as the
choice of specified date is wholly arbitrary, the classification based
on the fortuitous circumstance of retirement before or subsequent
 
K                                          ****************
                                Kindly visit the website at www.nhrc.nic.in to view the entire narration.
31
Retiral Benefits as a Human
Right – NHRC
Initiatives
to the specified date is invalid and that the scheme of liberalization
in computation of pension must be uniformly enforced with regard
to all pensioners.
Counsel for respondents contended that a classification based
on the date of retirement is valid for the purpose of granting
pensionary benefits, that the specified date is an integral part of
the scheme of liberalization and that the Government would never
have enforced the scheme devoid of the date. Further, that the
doctrine of severability cannot be invoked to sever the specified
date from the scheme as it would have the effect of enlarging the
class of pensioners covered by the scheme when the legislature has
expressly defined the class to which the legislation applies. It would
be outside the judicial function to enlarge the class. There is not a
single case, where the court has included some category that “If
more persons divided the available cake the residue falling to the
share of each, especially to the share of those who are not before
the court would become far less and therefore no relief could be
given to the petitioners that pension is always correlated to the
date of retirement and the court cannot change the date of retirement
and impose fresh commutation benefit which may burden the
exchequer to the tune of Rs. 233 crores; and that the third petitioner
has no locus standi in the case.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of
treatment. It is attracted where equals are treated differently without
any reasonable basis. The principle underlying the guarantee is
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both
in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would
have to be applied to all in the same situation and there should be
no discrimination between one person and another if as regards
the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially

Wednesday, 9 September 2015

Govt. grants OROP, now would LIC grant us our arrears?

 The Government has finally granted OROP to the ex-defense personnel. Three cheers to that belated but good decision. This is a prospective payment.

Now would LIC take the cue and please grant its resigning ex-employees their legally rightful dues; their wage revision arrears and difference in retirement dues, w.e.f. 1997? This is a retrospective payment. 

All the resigning ex-employees were on the rolls of the Corporation on the date from which these retrospective payments were effective, but were unjustly denied payment, arbitrarily, as admitted by LIC itself, in its response to my RTI application dated 11th February, 2012.

The ongoing Insurance Week celebrations would be truly meaningful if LIC cares to release our dues too!

Isn't it said in Hindi, "Der aaye, durust aaye!"

and in English, "Better late, than never!"